

NO DESIGN DOCUMENT

(Project summaries/abstracts developed from

PRO AGs, PIOTs, and PARs)

NOTE: This report reflects project status at the time of the precipitous fall of the GVN in April 1975

TERMINAL PROJECT APPRAISAL REPORT (PAR)

REPORT  
73004173  
PP-ADF-375-C1

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1. PROJECT NO 730-11-820-417	2. PAR FOR PERIOD 11/01/73 TO 04/29/75	3. COUNTRY Vietnam	4. PAR SERIAL NO. 730-75-TP-17
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Child Care

20 p

6. PROJECT DURATION: Begin FY 1974 End FY 1977	7. DATE LATEST PROP ---	8. DATE LATEST PIP ---	9. DATE PRIOR PAR ---
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10. U.S. FUNDING	a. Cumulative Obligation This Prior FY: \$7,322,000	b. Current FY Estimated Budget: \$8,215,000	c. Estimated Budget to completion After Current FY: \$19,537,000
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11. KEY ACTION AGENTS (Contractor, Participating Agency, or Voluntary Agency)

a. NAME	b. CONTRACT, PASA OR VOL. AG. NO.
Travelers Aid-International Social Services of America	AID/vn-102; AID/sa-G-1039
Holt International Children's Fund, Inc.	AID 730-g-001; 730-g-009
Catholic Relief Service	AID 730-g-008; -007; -003; -006; -011; 40257; 730-3531

I. NEW ACTIONS PROPOSED AND REQUESTED AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION

A. ACTION #1			B. List of Lessons Learned	C. PROPOSED ACTION COMPLETION DATE
MISSION	A.I.D.W.	HOST		
			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Keep focus upon total program and not just upon highly visible sub-projects, i.e., orphanage improvement and adoption services.</li> <li>Quicker use of MSW/MOH planning capability through social welfare training and personnel selection.</li> <li>Difficulty in coordinating seven PVOs and two ministries and basic question of relative responsibilities.</li> <li>Delay encountered in implementation as result of AID and PVOs not having readily available expertise in child care.</li> <li>Lack of base line data and inability to develop alternatives.</li> <li>PVO tendency to each go their separate way and fail to relate to each other.</li> <li>Need to amend grants to increase advances (from 10% to 25% of total) and to allow maximum flexibility in use of funds for emergency needs.</li> <li>Focus host government and USAID attention upon more clear understanding of MSW and MOH roles in child care.</li> <li>Need for additional programs, i.e., youth program and information and referral service.</li> </ol>	<p>Clearances: EA/VN: FThompson <i>[Signature]</i> EA/DP: WLefer <i>[Signature]</i></p>

D. REPLAN	REVISOR	<input type="checkbox"/> PROP	<input type="checkbox"/> PIP	<input type="checkbox"/> PROAG	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P	E. DATE OF REVIEW
SIGNED NAME, SIGNED INITIALS, AND DATE <i>[Signature]</i> E.G. Ruoff/RLKing							MISSION DIRECTOR: TYPED NAME, SIGNED INITIALS, AND DATE Acting, EA/VN, Anthony H. Wirtz <i>[Signature]</i> 10/6/75	

11. KEY ACTION AGENTS (Contractor, Participating Agency,  
or Voluntary Agency)

a. NAME	b. CONTRACT, PASA, OR VOL. AG. NO
Friends For All Children	AID 730-g-005;
International Rescue Committee ✓	730-3643
Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere ✓	AID 730-g-002; -012
World Vision Relief Organization	AID 730-g-004; -010

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**II. PERFORMANCE OF KEY INPUTS AND ACTION AGENTS**

A. INPUT OR ACTION AGENT CONTRACTOR, PARTICIPATING AGENCY, OR VOLUNTARY AGENCY	B. PERFORMANCE AGAINST PLAN							C. IMPORTANCE FOR ACHIEVING PROJECT PURPOSE (X)				
	UNSATISFACTORY		SATISFACTORY			OUTSTANDING		LOW		MEDIUM		HIGH
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5
1. Holt International Children's Fund (Adoption)-001					X							X
2. CARE (Day Care)-002			X									
3. Catholic Relief Service (Orphanages)-003				X								X

Comment on key factors determining rating.

The above is based almost entirely upon a ten-month period whereas the proposed PROP envisaged a program of no less than three years. The grading of performance against plan is based primarily against total fiscal expenditures and not upon actual program expenditures. The four items shown as unsatisfactory were due to the inability of the agencies to utilize available funds. The cause was invariably due to lack of trained personnel to administer the programs. Other programs, i.e., CARE's Day Care and WVRO's Nursery were not moving at the expected levels of activity because of unilateral changes in program objectives by the voluntary agencies.

4. PARTICIPANT TRAINING	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5
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Comment on key factors determining rating.

There were no participants trained under this program. However, there was to be a considerable amount of OJT and other types of training under each agency grant. These training activities were not spelled out per se but should have been. We had assigned one PSC personnel to the training activity.

5. COMMODITIES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5
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Comment on key factors determining rating.

Commodities were all to be purchased in Vietnam and there was no difficulty in obtaining what was required.

6. COOPERATING COUNTRY	a. PERSONNEL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5
	b. OTHER Coordinating Volags		X									X	

Comment on key factors determining rating.

The Ministry of Social Welfare fell far short of plan both regarding personnel and coordination of volag activities. Personnel were late in being assigned to project activities and when finally assigned were not given specific instructions as to their duties. Other MSW personnel did not accept the principle of utilizing volags in the program and as a result did not cooperate. They did not review volag work plans and continued to argue that the Ministry could do the work better. In addition MSW personnel continued to agitate for no volag participation well into the second half of the program year. Only with the International Conference was there a change on Ministry direction and then time ran out.

7 OTHER DONORS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5
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PAGE 3 PAR				

II. 7. Continued: Comment on key factors determining rating of Other Donors

Although AID was the only international donor in this project, the volags gave some support. All of the adoption agencies gave liberally of their own time and money to see projects succeed. Other volags provided only what the grant called for. Because the Congress earmarked funds for child care, the older volags took the position that none of their funding was required and that AID would provide all.

III. KEY OUTPUT INDICATORS AND TARGETS

A. QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS FOR MAJOR OUTPUTS		TARGETS (Percentage/Rate/Amount)					END OF PROJECT
		CUMULATIVE PRIOR FY	CURRENT FY		FY ____	FY ____	
			TO DATE	TO END			
Day Care Centers up-graded or established and operating	PLANNED			500			700
	ACTUAL PERFORMANCE		87*				
	REPLANNED						
Home Nurseries upgraded or established and operating	PLANNED			200			1,000
	ACTUAL PERFORMANCE		1,269*				
	REPLANNED						
Intercountry adoptions completed	PLANNED	--	--	1,000	1,000	1,000	
	ACTUAL PERFORMANCE	872	3,229				
	REPLANNED						
Nutrition Centers established and operating	PLANNED			1			5
	ACTUAL PERFORMANCE		12*				
	REPLANNED						
B. QUALITATIVE INDICATORS FOR MAJOR OUTPUTS	COMMENT: All but two of the registered orphanages had been visited at least twice, food allowances established and delivered, local hospitals contacted and asked to increase their assistance to orphans, education classes established in some orphanages and sanitation improved.						
1.	Orphanages improved						
2.	Pediatric care of needy and orphaned children provided	COMMENT: Two intensive care units consisting of 70 and 15 beds respectively were established, manned, equipped and caring for children.					
3.	Assistance to handicapped children provided	COMMENT: Arrangements were completed by the MSW with five Medical Institutions to care for handicapped children, facility renovations had been initiated or completed in four of the Institutions, and child care was being provided in three.					

\* Estimates based on available data

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IV. PROJECT PURPOSE

A. 1. Statement of purpose as currently envisaged.

2. Same as in PROP?  YES  NO

To meet the immediate needs of children disadvantaged by the war, and ameliorate conditions which give rise to child neglect and abandonment.

(Although AID/W viewed the project purpose as being the development of the GVN's institutional capability, the Mission's actual emphasis at the start was the immediate care of children.)

B. 1. Conditions which will exist when above purpose is achieved.	2. Evidence to date of progress toward these conditions.
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Needy families better able to care for their children.</li> <li>2. Social and physical condition of children in orphanages improved.</li> <li>3. Orphanages screen all children for possible alternative placement.</li> <li>4. Orphans and needy children receive medical care.</li> </ol>	<p>The project was in effect for less than a year prior to the fall of the Government of South Vietnam. Progress was being made in all categories of the program although certain sub-projects were far ahead of others. The sub-projects as shown in II A above indicate this disparity in progress. However, following the International Childrens Conference in Saigon in late January 1975, we all anticipated increased coordination by the Vietnamese and improved program implementation by the volags.</p>

V. PROGRAMMING GOAL

A. Statement of Programming Goal

B. Will the achievement of the project purpose make a significant contribution to the programming goal, given the magnitude of the national problem? Cite evidence.

## General Comments

The Child Care Project served a number of very useful purposes which might not be apparent from a reading of the preceding portions of this PAR (which was largely prepared by Mr. E.G. Ruoff). Quite apart from the very large increases in resources made available by the Project, the planning and, finally, the signing of the implementing agreements; the acquisition of additional professional talent, and the follow-up Conference on Children and National Development which took place in January 1975 <sup>1/2/3/</sup>; all contributed to focusing GVN/USG/PVO attention on the need for greatly expanded--but well-coordinated--programs of assistance to disadvantaged children. A secondary achievement of the project, which had begun to clearly manifest itself when the project was aborted, was an increased MSW project planning and implementation capability.<sup>4/</sup> As noted below in the appraisal of the major components of the project, the MSW and the MOH were asked to play an increasingly larger role vis a vis the PVO's. It must be noted that this achievement was secondary only in the sense of chronological occurrence. In fact, this increasing GVN competence was recognized as having far more long-range importance for the welfare of the children<sup>5/</sup> than the immediate assistance being provided under the project. A third, extremely important achievement--arising at least in part out of the pre-project planning--was the GVN decision<sup>6/</sup> to give the MSW the power to coordinate GVN efforts in the child care area.

## Final Status Report

The following are observations on the status of the Child Care Project at the time of its premature termination. They are based in part on observations recorded hastily by the AID Project Officer (Mr. R. L. King) in a time frame which did not permit his systematic review and evaluation of such relevant documents

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1/ Report on Visit to South Vietnam by Martha Branscombe; March 22, 1975

2/ A Second Visit to Vietnam by Jean & John Thomas; January 1975

3/ Report on Visit to Vietnam by Ursula M. Gallagher; circa January 1975

4/ See 1/ above pp 1, 5 and 6

5/ See 1/ above pp 4 & 5; Recommendations by Della B. Scott; August 1, 1975; p. 1; Final Grant Report by John L. Williams; July 22, 1975; p. 2; Final Family Services Report by Emmett K. Turner; circa June 1975; p. 2

6/ See 2/ above p. 6



as cables, program documents (Proags, grants to voluntary agencies, etc.), the PROP submission of December 1974 (and ensuing AID/USAID discussion), and audit reports and responses thereto. In addition, all of the PVO grantees' final reports, as required under the grants, were not yet available at the time the original observations were made. The Project Officer's observations have since been elaborated upon by the EA/TD/SD staff which may explain some of the discontinuities which appear in the remaining portions of this report.

#### Program Emphasis

The purpose of the project was to assist children disadvantaged by the war. Within this context, the emphasis was on assisting families to care for their own children in Vietnam, thus reducing the need for institutionalization or adoption. There was a conscious effort to keep in perspective (without unduly minimizing) the need for orphanage improvement and for adoption services for children for whom no suitable alternative existed. (The overseas adoption program which culminated in and received such wide notice during Operation Babylift<sup>7/</sup> never received more than ten percent of the total child care funds available and was considered a specialized, ancillary service for abandoned children for whom no suitable alternative was available in South Vietnam.

We believe the project was successful in providing this emphasis, which represented the common view of the Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW), USAID, and AID/W as to where the needs lay. In responding to public inquiries it was often necessary, however, to make explicit the point that "child care" involved more than orphanages and adoption.

An indication of the relative importance attached to each of the elements of the project as well as the increasingly more important role of the MSW/MOH vis a vis the PVOs is provided by the FY 1974 allocation of funds table and the projected summary of FY 75 funds which follow.

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<sup>7/</sup> See Operation Babylift Report April-June 1975; AID

CHILD CARE PROGRAM IN VIETNAM, 197  
ALLOCATION OF FUNDS

<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>FUNDS</u>	<u>DATE EFFECTIVE</u>
Intercountry Adoption and Related Child Care Services	Traveler's Aid-International Social Services of America	224,000.00	11/01/73
	Holt International Children's Service	225,000.00	04/25/74
	Catholic Relief Services	143,000.00	06/01/74
	Friends For All Children	100,000.00	06/01/74
	Interagency Vietnamese Adoption Committee	24,200.00	03/06/74
	--do--	96,000.00	05/15/74
Orphanage Support and Improvement	Catholic Relief Services	25,000.00	01/31/74
	--do--	1,355,000.00	04/15/74
Supplementary Rice Allowance for Orphanages	Ministry of Social Welfare	134,579.43	02/20/74
Medical Care for Selected Orphanages	Ministry of Social Welfare	53,883.83	06/28/74
Day Care Centers	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere	1,180,000.00	04/15/74
Pediatric Clinics	International Rescue Committee	234,187.00	12/16/73
	World Relief Commission	28,467.74	06/15/74
Family Assistance and Foster Care	Holt International Children's Service	500,000.00	06/01/74
Home Nurseries	Catholic Relief Services	417,000.00	06/01/74
	World Vision Relief Organization	200,000.00	06/01/74
Nutrition Centers	Catholic Relief Services	410,000.00	06/01/74
	World Vision Relief Organization	200,000.00	06/01/74
Prevention of Infant Abandonment	Catholic Relief Services	25,000.00	06/01/74
Handicapped Children	Ministry of Social Welfare	200,000.00	06/28/74
GVN's General Child Care Program	Ministry of Social Welfare	1,177,580.00	01/01/74
Child Health Services	Ministry of Health	324,000.00	06/26/74
Three Personal Services Contracts	USAID	16,552.00	11/15/73
		32,750.00	05/22/74
		24,000.00	09/01/74
Technical Assistance	USAID Personnel	<u>118,000.00</u>	07/01/74
		<u>7,468,200.00</u>	

SUMMARY OF FY 75 CHILD CARE PROGRAM

A. <u>Project</u>	<u>Ministry of Social Welfare</u> (\$000)	<u>Voluntary Agencies</u> (\$000)	<u>Total</u> (\$000)
Adoption		1,000	1,000
Day Care	450	1,180	1,630
Nutrition		610	610
Nurseries		450	450
Family Assistance	700	700	1,400
Orphanages	450	1,000	1,450
Family Service*	150	100	250
Handicapped Children (MOH)**	450		450
Medical Support/ Orphanages (MOH)**	100		100
Youth	300	300	600
Information and Referral	200		200
Child Health (MOH)**	795		795
Misc. Program Support		321	321
	_____	_____	_____
Sub-Totals	3,595 1	5,661	9,256
B. <u>Other Costs</u>			
USAID Personnel			127
Contract Services			589
Participants			20
Commodities (Milk)			8
			_____
Sub-Totals			744
			_____
TOTAL (A + B)			<u>\$10,000</u>

\* Previously "Prevention of Infant Abandonment"  
\*\* Ministry of Health

### The Ministry and the Voluntary Agencies

The question of the relative responsibilities of, and the inter-relationships between the MSW and the concerned PVOs was of constant concern throughout the life of the project.

The Congressional earmarking of \$5 million in FY 74, to which the USAID added \$2.5 million for a \$7.5 million total, multiplied by several times the money previously available for child care activities. On the basis of experience with the MSW's handling of previous funding, we concluded that it could not handle the larger amount and that the involvement of the PVOs, through direct grants to them, was necessary. At the same time we considered it essential that the MSW be fully involved in the entire program, administering some programs directly and being fully involved in the planning, approval, and implementation of all PVO programs. The then (early CY 74) Minister of Social Welfare (Dr. Phieu) agreed with this approach.

It was expected, and eventually planned, that the MSW (and MOH) share of the total for FY 75 would increase. Even in FY 74 the MSW/PVO proportions changed; \$200,000 originally expected to be granted to a PVO for a handicapped childrens' program was given instead to the MSW, and \$53,000 was added to the MSW total to fund a program of supplementary medical assistance to orphanages.

During the year the Ministry did well in administering its Civilian Widows (family assistance for widows with three or more children) program, which had been initiated and included in AID/MSW funding prior to the \$5 million earmarking, and in making a good start in its handicapped children program. While MSW involvement in PVO programs were not as full as we would have wished<sup>8/9/</sup> some experience was gained here also. Plans to allocate more FY 75 funds to the MSW and MOH were, we believe, justified by experience with FY 74 funds, and increased MSW/PVO coordination within and between programs was reasonably to be expected.

### Comments on Specific Programs

The following comments relate to the programs as they were progressing prior to the April 1975 evacuation. In March all grants

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8/ Final Contract Report by Vera Camden; circa June 1975; p. 1

9/ Final Contract Report by Turner; June 30, 1975; p. 2 and  
Attached Letter to Mr. Robert Stephenson, February 27, 1975;  
p. 2

(except the four adoption grants and the small CRS Prevention of Infant Abandonment Grant) were amended to increase the authorized advances and to allow maximum flexibility in using the funds for emergency feeding and other emergency needs.

### Intercountry Adoption

The Mission, while making grants to only four of the seven GVN-authorized international adoption agencies, was throughout the life of the project intimately involved in the entire question of adoption, and sought to foster better relations between the Ministry and the adoption PVOs and among the PVOs themselves.

The Ministry, USAID, and the agencies all agreed that adoption was a solution of last resort <sup>10/</sup> but that for some children there was no other solution. Ministry officials, however, tended to be negative in their underlying feelings about adoption<sup>11/</sup>, while at least some of the agencies seemed to the Ministry to be giving mainly lip service to the subordination of adoption to other solutions <sup>12/</sup>.

The Ministry was slow in establishing a functioning "adoption unit" in its Social Welfare bloc. The very able official put in charge sought to establish and enforce high standards, to be applied care-by-case. However she was not given adequate staff and bottlenecks persisted, thus reinforcing the feeling of some PVOs that the Ministry was simply obstructionist. USAID supported the Ministry's renewed assertion of its responsibility for assuring good adoption practice and at the same time urged the Ministry to improve its service to the PVOs in expediting the processing of approved adoption cases.

Adoptions through the seven GVN-authorized agencies totalled 1,062 in 1974. A level of about 1,200 adoptions per year was acceptable to the GVN and was planned for CY 1975. The conditions just before the fall of Vietnam, however, resulted in GVN/USAID/PVO decisions to evacuate larger numbers of orphans

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<sup>10/</sup> See <sup>2/</sup> above; p. 10

<sup>11/</sup> Memoranda by Della Scott; August 1, 1975: "Holt International Children's Fund"; p. 2; "Assessment of Grants Relative to Future USAID Program Planning"; p. 1

<sup>12/</sup> Ibid: "Recommendations"; pp 1 & 2

being processed for adoption in the U.S. and other countries. The emergency evacuation of about 2,600 children, added to adoptions accomplished in the first quarter of CY 1975, made an overall total of over 3,000. The so-called "babylift" has been described in detail in an AID/W (EA/TD/SD) paper. 13/

It must be noted that an unforeseen and undesirable spirit of competitiveness between the PVO adoption agencies emerged during the course of the project. 14/ 15/

#### Orphanage Improvement

Effectively managed by CRS. MSW assistance to orphanages continued. Another year would have seen better CRS/MSW coordination. Reports from a number of sources provide further detail. 16/17/

#### Medical Support to Orphanages

This modest \$53,000 program, which provided for the use of medical students and interns to give medical assistance in orphanages, was satisfactorily managed by MSW. Increased funding was planned for FY 76.

#### Day Care

MSW continued assistance to day care centers but responsibility for improvement of these centers and establishment of up to 200 new centers rested with CARE under a \$1,180,000 grant. The CARE grant became a problem, due to CARE's determination to try for unrealistically high standards in a few centers rather than, as required by the grant, moving expeditiously to establish more centers to care for more children. CARE on the other hand thought

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13/ See 7/ above

14/ See 11/ above: "Holt International Children's Fund"; p. 2; "Friends For All Children"; p. 2; "Recommendations"; pp. 2 & 3

15/ Report on Experiences and Observations by E.K. Turner; June 19, 1975; p. 5

16/ See 1/ above; pp. 9 & 10; 2/ above; pp. 13-15; and 3/ above pp. 10, 11, & 18

17/ MSW/CRS/USAID Semi-Annual Report Child Welfare Grants; circa Jan. 1975; pp 1-2 and Monthly Reports for Jan., Feb., and March 1975

that AID's expectations were unrealistic. 18/ The problem was being vigorously addressed by the program monitor (O'Neill) and others when the emergency developed and grant funds were largely diverted to emergency purposes.

### Pediatric Clinic

Managed by ADPH.

### Family Assistance

Both the "Civilian Widows" program of the MSW and the Holt "Family Assistance" program were programs of family assistance (see also "Prevention of Infant Abandonment," below). The former was MSW's most ambitious, effective, and promising program, and the latter, while starting late, also showed promise. Perhaps more importantly for the future (unfortunately aborted) was the fact that the MSW and USAID officials concerned were developing cooperative relations looking toward a coherent program under MSW supervision. More than in other programs, the desired relations between the host country and the PVOs were beginning to take shape.

The Civilian Widows program was the major program administered by the MSW. (The MSW's orphanage and day care programs were essentially fund allocations to institutions, and the Handicapped Children program had just begun when Vietnam fell.) Under an energetic and innovative project manager 19/ 20/ (Miss Quoi), the GVN program met the needs of some 4,000 widows with 20,000 children. It emphasized self-help. Funds were distributed by MSW through a large number of Vietnamese agencies (mostly small) and sometimes through child care institutions acting as agencies, thus fostering the development of a network of increasingly experienced agencies for the future. Training of participating agency personnel was carried out through regional seminars. Miss Quoi was responsive to suggestions from her USAID counterpart (Ms. Camden) and an excellent cooperative relationship was established and maintained. Ms. Camden's suggestion that the PVO's (Holt) Family Assistance program be coordinated with the existing MSW program was gladly accepted by Miss Quoi. Ms. Camden's report 21/ gives further details on the program.

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18/ CARE Report on Day Care Centers; circa July 1975; pp. 2-5

19/ See 3/ above; p. 16

20/ See 8/ above; p. 3

21/ Ibid

The Holt Family Assistance grant was late in getting started,<sup>22/</sup> owing to Holt's difficulties in finding and hiring a program manager. When he (Mr. John Williams) did arrive he proved to be unusually effective. He and the USAID consultant (Mr. Emmett Turner) agreed to the desirability of close coordination between Holt and the MSW with a view to MSW's eventually assuming full responsibility for overall family assistance programming, managing the funds allocated to these programs and administering their operations. Messrs. Williams and Turner established excellent relations with Miss Quoi of MSW. All three, and Ms. Camden, agreed that the future should see greater utilization of Vietnamese agencies, and steps were being taken in this direction when the end came.

During the short time the Holt program was operational it helped about 1,700 families including about 8,500 children.<sup>23/</sup> Services were delivered by Holt and three sub-grant agencies (Baptist Social Services, Christian and Missionary Alliance, and CDF/SAVB), and Vietnamese agencies were beginning to be involved.

Reports by Williams and Turner give further details.<sup>24/</sup>

Family Service (Previously "Prevention of Infant Abandonment")

Although certainly no one ever meant the original designation of the MSW and CRS grant programs, "prevention of infant abandonment" to imply that Vietnamese women in difficult situations wanted to abandon their children, it unfortunately took on this connotation,<sup>25/</sup> especially in Vietnamese translation. All concerned were therefore happy to change the title to "family services,"<sup>26/</sup> in this case referring more precisely to helping families survive and thrive by helping hard-pressed mothers do what they wanted to do, i.e., keep their children, despite pressures of circumstances pushing them toward abandonment.

Ms. Camden's final contract report summarizes the problems and accomplishments of the MSW and CRS programs. Efforts were made to bring the two programs together in a joint addressing of the problem. Other agencies, e.g., Holt, also made a special effort

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<sup>22/</sup> Final Family Services Report by E.K. Turner; circa June 1975; p. 1

<sup>23/</sup> Final Grant Report by John L. Williams; July 22, 1975; p. 1

<sup>24/</sup> Ibid; see also <sup>9/</sup> and <sup>22/</sup> above

<sup>25/</sup> See <sup>8/</sup> above; p. 1

<sup>26/</sup> See <sup>17/</sup> above; p. 6



to induce mothers or expectant mothers wishing to abandon a baby to accept an alternative solution permitting them to keep their child.

### Home Nurseries

This program provided support for the improvement of existing, and the establishment of new, home nurseries, i.e., small centers in which a widow or housewife, generally in her own home, cares for five to eight infants and pre-school children whose mothers can then seek work to help support their families. Funding was through two grants, to CRS (\$417,000) and WVRO (\$200,000). The CRS program made a slow start. WVRO mounted an effective program.

At the time of closure, WVRO had 225 home nurseries in operation, assisting 1,800 children and their 562 mothers 27/ (this exceeded the PROP projections). The 225 nursery "mothers" were given funds for food purchases and trained in marketing, food preparation, and simple medical care. Households were supplied with medical kits, chairs, tables, etc. The nurseries were well received by the Vietnamese communities, and WVRO planned to establish more nurseries. In its final report, WVRO recommended more involvement by the host government (which WVRO might have mentioned would require greater WVRO as well as USAID and GVN effort) and technical training for the mothers leaving their children in the nurseries, to improve their (the mothers') capability for eventual self-support.28/

### Nutrition

The two grant agencies for this project, CRS (\$410,000) and WVRO (\$150,000) conducted effective programs which were running well at the time of Vietnam's collapse.

CRS provided funds on a "purchase of service" basis to six existing institutions (total capacity 440 children) to enable them to provide or expand intensive nutritional care to infants and children.29/ CRS also conducted a family nutrition program of classes for mothers and provided funds for food purchases for children. CRS reports describe the program.

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27/ World Vision of Vietnam Final Report--Home Nurseries by J. Don Scott; June 10, 1975; p. 1

28/ Ibid; p. 4

29/ See 17/ above; p. 3

WVRO opened five new centers with total capacity of 135 <sup>30/</sup> (the total number of children to be helped would, of course, depend on turnover) and additional centers were planned. In a letter covering its final report, WVRO gave as among the "lessons learned" that because of the specialized nature of the work, considerable lead time was needed to engage personnel, etc.; program sites should be near medical facilities; a model site is important especially for training personnel for other centers. The report also noted some GVN reluctance to "become too involved;" here again, as with home nurseries, and in other programs with other agencies, the responsibility for better GVN/USAID/WVRO (or other agency) relations is one that must be shared by all concerned.

### Handicapped Children

This program was planned by the MSW, with \$200,000 USAID funding. Unlike the Civilian Widows program which had existed before the overall \$7.2 million program went into effect, the Handicapped Children program had to be developed more from scratch; prior MSW activity had been small financial contributions to a few institutions.

The Handicapped Children program, whose purposes etc., are briefly described in Proag Revision 16, represented MSW's first planning of a new and substantial program, and it took considerable time and great effort on the part of the MSW project manager (Ms. Ho) and the USAID consultant (Ms. Della Scott) to get organized. <sup>31/</sup> Grants were arranged to five institutions and organizations in November 1974; and by April 18, 1975, some progress had been realized. <sup>32/</sup>

Unfortunately the workplan for the program, called for in the Proag revision and submitted and approved in November 1974, <sup>33/</sup> is not available.

### Lessons Learned

#### A. The Pragmatic Approach

While the general purposes, and the general implementation framework, of the overall project and the individual grants were

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<sup>30/</sup> World Vision of Vietnam Final Report--Nutrition Centers by J. Don Scott; June 10, 1975; p. 3

<sup>31/</sup> See <sup>11/</sup> above: "Handicapped Children"; p. 4

<sup>32/</sup> Ibid, pp. 2-3

<sup>33/</sup> Ibid; p. 2

fairly clear, the problems arising in the administration of the project were various and required a pragmatic flexibility for their resolution. Much depended on the relationships established between USAID, the Ministry, and the volags, and between their respective personnel assigned to each project. While constantly increasing precision in defining objectives, means, evaluation techniques, etc., is of course essential, a healthy level of pragmatism in carrying out the program is also important.

B. The Importance of Helping the Host Government Develop Its Capabilities

It would have been easy to simply make grants to the PVOs and let them do the work (with AID supervision). This however would have been an indefensible bypassing of host country authorities. Apart from the moral issue, moreover, involving the Ministry as closely as possible paid practical dividends. Despite chronic confusion at the Assistant Minister for Social Welfare level (three people filled this role), several able project managers had an opportunity to display their abilities. This at least represented a potential for the Ministry to use in the future. We believe the Ministry was strengthened by the part it played in the program and that a basis was developed for future progress.

C. The Need for Additional Programs

Planning for FY 75 included two new programs for which a need was apparent. One was a program for youth (omitted in FY 74 which focussed limited resources on younger children). The other was for a social welfare information and referral service. Envisioned was a system of local offices or centers which would be fully informed of local and regional facilities and services and would be able to counsel people and refer them to the most appropriate source of help.

D. Social Work Training

The success of the Child Care Program in the long run would have depended largely on the development of a much larger and more professional body of social workers and other specialists serving in the GVN ministries and the U.S. and Vietnamese voluntary agencies. Such professionals were already available, but there were few of them, they were not usually in a position to strongly influence program planning, and communication between them was limited.

The Child Care Program, as established, envisaged as a vital function the training of child care workers. It did not, however, establish any new mechanisms to bring this about.

Ms. Camden, one of ADRR's contract social workers, recognized the need for fuller cooperation toward a solution and sought to bring it about. She succeeded in stimulating communication (meetings, etc.) between the various elements of the social work community. Her efforts were in the context of Vietnamese interests and efforts in the same direction and were effective, largely because they were low-key and did not threaten Vietnamese self-reliance and self-esteem.

Ms. Camden's final contract report outlines training efforts 34/ and offers suggestions which should be useful if a similar child care program is mounted by AID in other underdeveloped countries.

E. The Role of Professional Social Workers in the Program

The general outlines of the program were established in late 1973, largely by the ADRR staff, along lines presented in both MSW and USAID papers. Needs and the kinds of programs to meet those needs had been matters of discussion for at least two years before funds, through the Congressional earmarking, became sufficiently plentiful to actually allow for large-scale implementation. Thus the program derived in part from professional social work sources in the MSW (e.g., Miss Quoi) and from some USAID social workers (both Davis and Munro who were involved in early program discussions, had Masters Degrees in Social Work). At the time that the increased funding was allocated the ADRR had no social workers with a Masters Degree 35/ but its personnel had backgrounds helpful to the work, including considerable experience in Vietnam. Several major grants were well served by the consultative efforts of O'Neill and Nofflett. The Youth Program planning for 1975 was being energetically initiated by O'Neill in conjunction with MSW and interested agencies.

The engagement of additional staff, with a more specifically social work background, would have been desirable in any case, but was acutely required when the Child Care Program suddenly expanded. Such personnel (Social Work Masters Degree holders) were not available within AID and three experts (Camden, Turner, Scott) were therefore recruited from outside.

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34/ See 8/ above; pp. 2-7

35/ See 2/ above; p. 6

The three contract social workers brought new insights to the program and made useful recommendations. These contributed to the program and would have contributed even more in the future as the program got better organized and (necessarily) ad hoc solutions gave way to more systematic planning.

The final reports of Camden 36/ and Turner 37/ deserve careful review, especially if similar child care programs are planned in other countries in the future. Both (especially Turner) object to the excessively economic emphasis of overall AID programming, and take exception to the assumption that humanitarian benefits will automatically follow economic development. 38/ In discussing the Child Care Program in particular, Turner urges greater Vietnamese and foreign volag participation in planning. 39/ Camden stresses the need for more professional social workers in the agencies, and also in AID. She suggests, in fact, that the recently aborted program relied too heavily on the volags having the necessary expertise; the funding agency, she believes, should provide more positive professional leadership, setting standards to be met by agencies receiving grants. 40/ A detailed exposition of such points, and others, may be found in the Camden and Turner reports.

Certainly the contract social workers represented a strong plus in the program. Future programs in other countries would do well to incorporate a similar social worker component as soon as possible.

### Conclusion

Overall, we believe that the Child Care Project represented a substantial step toward an effective GVN system of social services. Many children were helped and a basis established for further development.

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36/ See 8/ above

37/ See 9/ above

38/ See 8/ above; p. 6 and Ibid pp. 2 & 3

39/ See 15/ above; pp. 5-7

40/ See 8/ above; p. 6