The Petition before the Delhi High Court was filed seeking a direction to the Central Adoption Resource Authority (CARA) to issue a ‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) for taking the adopted child to Australia. ByTulip Kanth|5 June 2025 10:30 AM Justice Sachin Datta, Delhi High Court The Delhi High Court has recently asked the Central Adoption Resource Authority to issue a ‘No Objection Certificate’ for taking a child to Australia pursuant to the adoption undertaken by the adoptive parents, who are Australian citizens. The High Court observed that concluded adoptions under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act can’t be retrospectively subject to any other extraneous requirements. The Petition before the High Court was filed by the petitioners seeking that the second respondent- Central Adoption Resource Authority (CARA) be directed to issue a ‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) for taking petitioner 2 (child) to Australia pursuant to the adoption of the petitioner child by the first petitioner and her husband. Also Read - Forceful Removal Of Minor Child From His Original Place Of Residence And Shifting Him To A New Residence Will Not Make Him An Ordinary Resident Of The... The Single Bench of Justice Sachin Datta said, “The implication of the above is that concluded adoptions under HAMA, are required to comply with the extant requirements set out in HAMA itself, and cannot be retrospectively subject to any other extraneous requirements / preconditions.” Advocate Sheena Chhabra represented the Petitioner while CGSC Pratima N. Lakra represented the Respondent. Factual Background The petitioners belong to a Sikh family. The adoptive father is the elder brother of the biological father. The adoptive parents are citizens of Australia, and they do not have a biological child. On the other hand, the biological parents already have a son along with Petitioner 2. It was agreed within the family that the biological parents would give the petitioner-child in adoption to the adoptive parents with free consent and without any fear or favour. It was the petitioners’ case that in the year 2020, the adoptive parents approached the CARA to issue the requisite NOC, which is mandatorily required to obtain a visa for the child to take him to Australia. It was emphasised that since then, the matter had been languishing and the requisite NOC had not been issued by the respondent, CARA. Also Read - Every Degree Awarded By University After Graduation Not A “Post-Graduation Qualification”: Delhi High Court Allows Plea Against Appointment Of NCISM... Reasoning The Bench took note of the fact that the concerned Adoption Deed was executed in 2020. The same, along with the necessary photographs showing handing over / taking over of the child, had been duly filed along with the present petition. It was further noticed that even the Australian Authorities, as per the applicable law, had confined to seeking certification as regards compliance with HAMA, and only a support letter was required from CARA on account of the fact that the present case is a HAMA adoption duly registered before September 2021. The Bench affirmed that the petitioners had rightly relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prema Gopal v. Central Adoption Resource Authority & Ors. (2024), where the act of giving and taking of the children was performed in 2020. It was observed therein that there can be no hurdle in the consideration of the case of the petitioner therein, having regard to the provisions of the Adoption Regulations, 2022 and considering that the adoption took place before the coming into force of the said regulations. Specific directions were also issued to CARA to issue a No Objection Certificate to the petitioner. Also Read - Delhi High Court Imposes ₹50,000 Cost For Writ Petition Filed Without Petitioner’s Signature The Bench thus said, “As such, the respondent no. 2 is bound to follow the same procedure in the present case as well; after considering the certificate issued by the District Magistrate, the matter is required to be processed for issuance of a No Objection Certificate/support letter, as sought by communication dated 19.03.2024 issued by the Department of Home Affairs, Australian Government.” Reference was made to a judgment Narinderjit Kaur v. Union of India and Another (1997), wherein it has been observed that a child can be adopted “under the authority” of the parents. The Court noticed that the concerned Adoption Deed had already been registered based on the Power of Attorney in question. The religious rituals and ceremony for adoption were executed in the year 2020 (much before registration of the Adoption Deed) in the presence of the adopted parents and biological parents, and the handing over and taking over of the child also happened on that day itself. There was no controversy that the Adoption Deed that was executed thereafter was based upon authorisation given by the adoptive parents in favour of their mother, who is also the mother of the biological parents. Also Read - Effort Should Be Made By Investigating Agency To Use Technological Means In Aid Of Investigation: Delhi High Court While Refusing Bail To NDPS Act... Thus, holding that there was no impediment in issuing the requisite NOC to take the petitioner-child to Australia, the Bench ordered, “...the respondent no. 2 (CARA) is directed to issue the requisite NOC to the petitioners within a period of four weeks from today.” Cause Title: Jasleeniqbal Sidhu & Ors. v. Union of India Through Principal Secretary & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4884) Appearance: Petitioner: Advocates Sheena Chhabra, Anjani Chhabra, Aakashi Gupta, Shilpa Chaurasia Respondent: CGSC Pratima N. Lakra, Advocates Chandan Prajapati, Shailendra Kumar Mishra, Chandni Godiyal, P. Chandni, Sumit Bhargava, Asst. Director for CARA G. Ravi Click here to read/download Order Delhi High CourtJustice Sachin Datta Tulip Kanth Assistant Editor Tulip Kanth is an Assistant Editor at Verdictum having over 5 years of experience in the field of legal journalism and editing. She extensively covers judgments of the Supreme Court, High Courts as well as Tribunals. She has previously worked with a legal publishing website where she oversaw the work of other editors and has also created updates on notifications of different Government Ministries. She holds an English Honours Degree from SGTB Khalsa College, Delhi University and has completed her LLB course with specialisation in Corporate Law from Amity University. Next Story Forceful Removal Of Minor Child From His Original Place Of Residence And Shifting Him To A New Residence Will Not Make Him An Ordinary Resident Of The New Place: Delhi High Court The Court held that unilateral detention of a minor child in India by one parent during a short visit does not make the child an ordinary resident for the purpose of Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act. ByNamrata Banerjee|8 June 2025 5:30 PM The Delhi High Court observed that the forceful removal of a minor child from his original place of residence and shifting him to a new residence will not make him an ordinary resident of the new place. A Division Bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Renu Bhatnagar observed:” Merely because the wife has decided to stay back in India and has got the minor child admitted to a school here, would not, therefore, make the minor child an ordinary resident of Delhi (India). As noted hereinabove, such forceful removal/detention, even by a parent, at a place that is not the natural habitation of the minor child, would not render such other place the ordinary place of residence of the minor child.” Advocate Jai Sahai Endlaw appeared for the Appellant, while Advocate Prabhjit Jauhar represented the Respondent. Brief Facts The parties, both permanent residents of the United States and holders of long-term resident status, had been residing in the US continuously since after their marriage. Their minor child, a US citizen by birth, was also living in the United States and attending school there. During a planned short vacation, the parties travelled together to India along with the child. Shortly after arrival, the Petitioner, with assistance from airport authorities, separated the child from the other parent and decided not to return to the US. The return tickets for all three had been pre-booked, but the Petitioner unilaterally chose to remain in India and subsequently initiated various legal proceedings, including a guardianship petition seeking sole custody under the Guardians and Wards Act. The Respondent, upon returning to the United States, approached the competent court in that jurisdiction. The US court declined to pass ex parte relief but ultimately issued a detailed parenting order granting residential custody and sole decision-making rights to the Respondent, with scheduled visitation and parenting time for the Petitioner. The order also directed that the minor child be returned to the United States. Despite the US court’s order, the Petitioner filed a guardianship petition before a Family Court in India, claiming that the minor child was now “ordinarily residing” in Delhi. The Family Court rejected the petition under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for lack of territorial jurisdiction, holding that the minor had not established ordinary residence in India. The Petitioner filed an appeal against this order, and the Respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking the return of the minor child in compliance with the foreign custody order. Reasoning of the Court The Court examined the meaning and applicability of “ordinary residence” under Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act and concluded that unilateral removal cannot found jurisdiction. The Court observed, “The forceful removal of a minor child from his original place of residence and shifting him to a new residence will not make him an ordinary resident of the new place.” The Court noted that while it was correct that for purposes of invoking jurisdiction under Section 9 of the G&W Act, it is not necessary for the child to be a permanent resident of the place, and even a temporary residence would suffice. “Such temporary residence should not be illegal or forceful. The court, on an overall reading of the petition shall have to determine whether the child can be said to be ordinarily residing within its jurisdiction”, the Court added. The Court observed, “In the present case, on a bare reading of the petition filed by the wife under the G&W Act, and the surrounding circumstances that are admitted by her, the minor child could not be said to be ordinarily residing within the jurisdiction of the learned Family Court.” On the factual aspect of residence, the Court further noted that the parties had visited India only for a short stay and had booked their return tickets for all three of them, and if the wife always had an intention of staying back in India on her return, at least, she did not manifest this to the husband before their departure from the USA. The Court clarified, “Merely because the wife has decided to stay back in India and has got the minor child admitted to a school here, would not, therefore, make the minor child an ordinary resident of Delhi (India). As noted hereinabove, such forceful removal/detention, even by a parent, at a place that is not the natural habitation of the minor child, would not render such other place the ordinary place of residence of the minor child.” The Court also considered the child’s welfare and the nature of the foreign court’s parenting plan, stating, “The Superior Court in Arizona has, at least prima facie, considered the welfare of the minor child and has passed directions for the return of the minor child to the USA and for the joint parenting of the minor child, which we find to be just and proper in the facts of the present case, and see no reason to disagree with the same.” “In our opinion also, the directions passed are in the best interest and welfare of the minor child, wherein the minor child will get the love and affection of both the parents…”, the Bench added. The Court held that the Family Court in India lacked jurisdiction to entertain the guardianship petition, as the child was not ordinarily residing in Delhi. It further held that the child’s continued presence in India resulted from a unilateral act that could not override lawful custody directions issued by the competent court in the United States. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, granting the Petitioner liberty to return abroad with the minor child by a fixed date. Cause Title: Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4483-DB) Appearance: Appellant: Advocates Jai Sahai Endlaw, Charu Dalal, Choudhary Amit Bassoya, Simran Johar Respondent: Advocates Prabhjit Jauhar, Aadarsh Kothari, Sahej Kataria Click here to read/download Judgment Justice Renu BhatnagarJustice Navin ChawlaDelhi High Court Namrata Banerjee Supreme Court Correspondent Namrata is a Correspondent covering the Supreme Court of India. She has previously practiced law and worked in-house with a Public Sector Undertaking. Next Story Every Degree Awarded By University After Graduation Not A “Post-Graduation Qualification”: Delhi High Court Allows Plea Against Appointment Of NCISM Chairperson The Delhi High Court allowed Writ Petitions against the appointment of Vaidya Jayant Yeshwant Deopujari to the post of Chairperson, National Commission for Indian System of Medicine. BySwasti Chaturvedi|6 June 2025 7:00 PM Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, Justice Tushar Rao Gedela, Delhi High Court The Delhi High Court held that every Degree awarded by a University after graduation cannot be termed to be a “post-graduation qualification”. The Court held thus in two Writ Petitions against the appointment of Vaidya Jayant Yeshwant Deopujari to the post of Chairperson, National Commission for Indian System of Medicine (NCISM). A Division Bench of Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela observed, “We are of the considered opinion that every degree awarded by a university after graduation cannot be termed to be a “post-graduation qualification” for the reason that in the domain of higher education in our country ‘Post-Graduate Degree’ has acquired a special meaning and significance and post-graduate degree means a Master’s Degree like M.A., M.Sc, M.D., LL.M or M.Ed.” The Bench also held that in case any public office is said to be occupied by holder of its office who does not possess the requisite eligibility qualification prescribed by the statute, or if appointment has been made in violation of statutory rules, locus of the person challenging such appointment by way of a prayer for issuance of Writ of Quo Warranto losses its relevance. Advocate Ashok Kumar Panigrahi represented the Petitioners while ASGs Chetan Sharma, Archana Dave, Senior Advocates Arun Bharadwaj, and Ruchi Kohli represented the Respondents. Challenge NCISM has been constituted under Section 3 of the National Commission for Indian System of Medicine Act, 2020 (NCISM Act). A prayer was made in the Petitions before the High Court for issuing a Writ of Quo Warranto as well as Writ of Certiorari, quashing and setting aside the appointment of the Respondent to the post of Chairperson, NCISM. Contentions The counsel for the Petitioners argued that the appointment of the Respondent has been made dehors the statutory provisions contained in Section 4(2) of the NCISM Act, and, therefore, such an appointment having been made in contravention of provisions of the statute, is not sustainable. It was further argued that the Respondent does not possess the statutorily provided requisite essential eligibility qualification in terms of Section 4(2) and hence, he is an usurper of the office of Chairperson of the Commission and, accordingly his appointment deserves to be quashed by issuing a Writ of Quo Warranto. It was also alleged that the Respondent neither possesses a post-graduate degree nor has 10 years’ experience as a leader in the area of healthcare delivery, growth, and development of Indian System of Medicine or its education and, therefore, lacks eligibility qualification. On the other hand, ASG contended that the Petition as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is not maintainable in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. Court’s Observations The High Court in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, said, “… for maintaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before a writ Court, the person approaching the Court need not establish any interest or any special or personal interest in the matter and, accordingly, we hold that locus of the petitioners in these two PIL petitions, since a writ of Quo Warranto has been sought, is of no relevance. What all the Court is required to consider is as to whether the appointment of respondent no.5 to the post in question was made in accordance with the statutory prescription contained in Section 4(2) of the NCISM Act, 2020 and as to whether he fulfils the requisite eligibility qualification as statutorily prescribed.” The Court added that if the Court comes to the conclusion that the Respondent does not fulfil the requisite eligibility qualification, the prayer made in the Petition for issuance of Writ of Quo Warranto can be granted otherwise, the same can be refused irrespective of the fact as to whether the Petitioners have any interest in the matter or not. “In case, it is shown and established that holder of the public office lacks the requisite qualification as prescribed by the statute or his appointment is dehors the statutory rules, a writ of Quo Warranto can be issued by the Courts, though, so far as the opinion of the selection/search committee of the merit on the candidate is concerned, since this Court would not act as an appellate authority over such opinion, interference in such a situation may be impermissible”, it emphasised. Furthermore, the Court noted that in our country, LL.B. degree where three-year course is prescribed (except in five years integrated courses) is awarded only to a candidate who is already possessed of a graduation degree, however, that will not mean that LL.B. Degree is a post-graduate degree in law; and similarly, B.Ed. degree is also awarded to a candidate who already is in possession of a graduation degree (except in four-year integrated courses), however, B.Ed. degree in the higher education world cannot be termed to be a post-graduate degree. “Post-graduate degree in education will be either M.A. (Education) or M.Ed. As a matter of fact, B.Ed. or LLB Degrees are not construed to be a post-graduate degree even though these degrees are obtained only after graduation”, it also observed. The Court remarked that healthcare delivery has to be understood to be a sector where healthcare is delivered using Indian System of Medicine, however, growth and development of Indian System of Medicine or its education has to be in relation to research and other academic activities. “In the instant case, the respondent No.5 is said to have been associated with a company or firm known as Shivayu Ayurved Limited, Nagpur which appears to be a drug manufacturer company where the respondent No.5 is said to be the Head of the R&D and F&D Departments and, therefore, we find ourselves unable to agree with the submission that experience of working in a drug manufacturing company will qualify the respondent No.5 to hold the requisite experience of a “Leader”, it further said. The Court held that the experience of the Respondent working in a company producing Ayurvedic medicine and products cannot be said to be an experience of working as a ‘Leader’ in the capacity of “Head of a Department” or “Head of an Organization”. Conclusion The Court, therefore, concluded, “Thus, the submission that since the Search Committee on whose recommendation respondent No.5 was appointed as Chairperson of the Commission comprise of experts and was headed by the Cabinet Secretary of Government of India and, therefore, any interference in the appointment in question herein would mean to sit in appeal over the decision of the experts, in the facts of the present case, does not hold good for the reason that it is a case where the respondent No.5 clearly lacked the essential eligibility qualification statutorily prescribed by Section 4(2) of the NCISM Act, 2020.” The Court held that the appointment of the Respondent as NCISM Chairperson does not fulfil the requisite qualification prescribed for appointment to the said office. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the Writ Petitions and issued a Writ of Quo Warranto, quashing and setting aside the appointment of the Respondent as Chairperson of the Commission. Cause Title- Dr. Ved Prakash Tyagi v. Union of India through Secretary Ministry of AYUSH & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4914-DB) Appearance: Petitioners: Advocates Ashok Kumar Panigrahi, Nabab Singh, Apurva Upamanyu, and Suryadeep Singh. Respondents: ASGs Chetan Sharma, Archana Dave, Senior Advocates Arun Bharadwaj, Ruchi Kohli, CGSCs Subhash Tanwar, Monika Arora, Advocates Sandeep Mishra, Naveen, Amit Gupta, Bhavi Garg, Kumar Prashant, Avnish Dave, Subhodeep Saha, Prabhat Kumar, Anamika Thakur, Ankita Chaudhary, Shreyas Balaji, Chand Kapoor, Srishti Mishra, and Neha Mishra. Click here to read/download the Judgment Delhi High CourtChief Justice Devendra Kumar UpadhyayaJustice Tushar Rao GedelaQuo Warranto WritAppointment Of ChairpersonMinistry of AYUSH Swasti Chaturvedi Assistant Editor Swasti Chaturvedi is an Assistant Editor at Verdictum, specializing in meticulously covering Supreme Court and High Court Judgments. She holds a postgraduate degree - LL.M. in Business Law and B.B.A. LL.B. from the Department of Law, PIMR, Indore, Madhya Pradesh. She brings over two years of expertise in legal writing and editing to her role. Prior to Verdictum, she worked as a Legal Analyst in the Corporate Sector. Next Story Delhi High Court Imposes ₹50,000 Cost For Writ Petition Filed Without Petitioner’s Signature A writ petition was filed without the petitioner’s signature using the advocate’s contact details. BySuchita Shukla|6 June 2025 6:30 PM Justice Mini Pushkarna The Delhi High Court imposed a cost of ₹50,000 on both a litigant and her counsel for filing a writ petition that lacked the litigant’s signature, highlighting a serious misuse of the judicial process. The case pertained to allegations of unauthorized construction in Delhi. The petition was filed before the Court with only the signature of the advocate and not that of the named petitioner. This irregularity was brought to the Court’s notice by the counsel representing the Delhi Development Authority (DDA). The DDA’s counsel pointed out that not only was the writ petition unsigned by the petitioner, but the mobile number and email address provided in the initial complaint filed before the Special Task Force (STF) regarding the alleged illegal construction also belonged to the counsel, not the petitioner. The Court observed that the contact details listed in the STF complaint were identical to those of the advocate representing the petitioner, suggesting that the complaint and petition may have been initiated solely by the lawyer. A Bench of Justice Mini Pushkarna strongly criticized the conduct of both the petitioner and the counsel. The Court condemned the apparent practice of advocates filing complaints concerning unauthorized construction in their own names and subsequently moving the Court under the guise of representing others, without obtaining proper authorization or signatures from the alleged petitioners. The Court said, “On account of the glaring facts presented before this Court, with regard the conduct of the petitioner and the counsel thereof, this Court has taken a very serious view of the matter, where complaints against unauthorised construction are being filed by advocates themselves, and writ petition is being filed without the signatures of the purported litigant.” During the proceedings, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) also informed the Court that appropriate action was already underway with respect to the unauthorized construction at issue. In view of the misconduct and misrepresentation, the Court dismissed the petition and directed, “Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, as noted above, the present writ petition is dismissed with cost of ₹50,000 to be borne jointly by both the petitioner and the counsel, to be paid towards the Delhi High Court Advocates Welfare Trust.” The matter has been listed before the Joint Registrar on July 21, 2025, to ensure compliance with the order regarding the payment of costs. Cause Title: Madhu Gupta v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors., [2025:DHC:4867] Appearance: Petitioner: Advocate Farhad Alam Respondents: Advocates Abhinav Singh and Somnath Shukla, Standing Counsel Prabhsahay Kaur, along with Advocates Kavya Shukla and Harshita Rai, Senior Panel Counsel Vinish Phoghat Click here to read/download Judgment Delhi High CourtJustice Mini Pushkarna Suchita Shukla Assistant Editor Suchita Shukla is an Assistant Editor at Verdictum, with a strong foundation in legal research and writing, she brings over 4.5 years of experience to the table, having honed her skills in the dynamic field of law. She covers Supreme Court and High Courts. She completed her BA-LLB (Hons.) 5-year course with specialisation in Intellectual Property rights from Galgotias University. Since 2019, apart from having worked at a legal publishing house she has also ventured into legal journalism. Next Story Effort Should Be Made By Investigating Agency To Use Technological Means In Aid Of Investigation: Delhi High Court While Refusing Bail To NDPS Act Accused The application before the Delhi High Court was filed for the grant of regular bail on behalf of the accused in a case registered under Sections 15, 25, 29 of the NDPS Act. ByTulip Kanth|6 June 2025 5:30 PM Justice Ravinder Dudeja, Delhi High Court While refusing to grant bail to an NDPS Act accused on the ground of parity, the Delhi High Court has held that ideally, every effort should be made by the investigating agency to use technological means in aid of investigation. The application before the Delhi High Court was filed under Section 483 of the BNSS read with Section 439 CrPC for the grant of regular bail filed on behalf of the petitioner in a case registered under Sections 15, 25, 29 of the NDPS Act. Noting that there was no independent public witness of recovery and there was no photography/videography of the recovery, the Single Bench of Justice Ravinder Dudeja said, “The use of technology certainly enhances the efficacy and transparency of the police investigation and assures fairness, and therefore, ideally, every effort should be made by the investigating agency to use technological means in aid of investigation. However, there may be situations where audio/video recording may not be feasible like the present case.” Advocate U.A. Khan represented the Petitioner while APP Aman Usman represented the Respondent. Factual Background In the year 2023, secret information was received that the petitioner and co-accused would bring poppy straw from Rajasthan in a vehicle and go to Azadpur. The raiding team took position, and the suspected vehicle was chased. One boy was found taking down a heavy sack, and another boy was keeping a sack on a motorcycle parked nearby. The Petitioner, co-accused and the taxi driver were caught. Notice under Section 50 NDPS Act was given to them. The sack recovered from the petitioner contained 10.86 kgs of poppy straw, and the co-accused’s sack contained 11.870 kgs of poppy straw. At the instance of the petitioner and co-accused, five more sacks containing poppy straw were recovered, totaling 54.64 kgs. Reasoning Referring to section 42, the Bench explained that upon receipt of secret information by an officer as regards contraband in some building, conveyance or enclosed placed, the same is required to be taken down in writing by such officer and is to be sent to an officer immediately superior to such officer receiving information within 72 hours. In cases where the warrant is required for affecting search after sunset, of a building, conveyance or enclosed place but the circumstances do not afford spending time for obtaining warrant, lest it would hamper the chances of the accused being caught, the officer concerned is required to take down the reasons for such omission to obtain warrants. “Considering that the recovery of contraband has been affected from a vehicle which was in ‘transit’ in a public place, Section 43 and proviso to Section 42 of the Act would get attracted with regard to the recovery of contraband from the petitioner at the spot”, it said. It was further explained that the combined recovery of contraband from the petitioner fell in the category of commercial quantity and the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would be attracted. “The provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act are mandatory in nature. The recording of finding as mandated in Section 37 is sine qua non for granting bail to the accused involved in the offences under the said Act. The twin conditions provided in the said Section are: (i) satisfaction of the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and; (ii) he is not likely to commit an offence while on bail”, it further noted. The Bench held, “The length of period of his custody or the fact that charge sheet has been filed and trial has commenced are by themselves not sufficient consideration that can be treated as a persuasive ground for granting relief to the petitioner under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. I am therefore not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner.” As per the Bench, there was nothing on record from which it could be inferred that the petitioner was not guilty of the offence in question. The Bench was of the view that the case of the co-accused was different from the petitioner's as they were not involved in any other case under the NDPS Act, but the petitioner was stated to be involved in two more cases under the NDPS Act. “Therefore, the Court is not satisfied that petitioner is not likely to commit an offence while on bail. Hence, petitioner is not entitled for grant of bail on parity”, the Bench said while dismissing the application.
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