INTRODUCTION
The 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of Intercountry Adoption was preceded by a lively debate over the type of framework that should be put in place to regulate the practice. Proposals ranged from the broadly social democratic and pro-organizational contention that this framework should rely on the state and on authoritative organizations to the more liberal view that intercountry adoption (ICA) should be framed around groups in society and individuals. The Convention provided a compromise that admitted to both approaches, but the debate has continued to rumble on, and since the USA brought the Convention into force in 2008, it has acquired a new impetus from the guidance issued by the Permanent Bureau at the Hague Conference.
The Permanent Bureau is one of a number of bodies that supports a social democratic approach and wishes to exclude as far as possible more liberal approaches. In accordance with this objective, it has set about interpreting the adoption process set out in the 1993 Convention in a way that emphasise its reliance on a central authority and authorised organizations at every stage, with little or no scope for allowing individuals and societal organizations to have decision making roles. The Convention requires all states to designate a central authority to act as a gatekeeper, with all adoptions in and out of the country being channelled through its system of checks. From the outset, the Permanent Bureau has argued that the role of the Central Authority is not just one of checking matches but also of making them. This interpretation was proposed in the Explanatory Report of Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren (1994) and has been strongly reiterated in the Permanent Bureau’s (2008)Guide to Good Practice.
The Guide calls for the prohibition of a form of ICA in which individuals or mediating bodies outside the formal structure of the central authority propose a match. This is referred to as an ‘independent adoption’. The Permanent Bureau argues that such adoptions are inconsistent with the Convention and that states should take measures to ‘eliminate’ them (Permanent Bureau, 2008: 626–7). Similarly, the draft guidance on accreditation of adoption agencies drawn up by the Permanent Bureau warns of ‘the dangers of private and independent adoptions’ (Permanent Bureau, 2010a, 32). A 2010 Special Commission has placed independent adoptions under further pressure. In preparation for the meeting of this Commission, the Permanent Bureau distributed a questionnaire to Convention countries. Under the pejorative heading ‘Questions on Abduction Sale and Traffic in Children in the Context of Adoption’, it asked ‘are private or independent adoptions permitted by your state’? Not surprisingly, numerous states answered ‘No’.1 The Special Commission met at The Hague on June 17–25 2010. Invited speakers presented papers that criticized independent adoptions (Mezmur, 2010; Smolin, 2010) and International Social Service (ISS) presented a paper that, in passing, classified them as illegal under the Convention (ISS, 2010a, 8). Towards the end of the conference a small committee got together and 2 h before the meeting came to an end, draft conclusions and recommendations were circulated to those in attendance and accepted (ISS, 2010b). Amongst them was the claim that if an adoption system is to be well regulated it is essential to prohibit independent adoptions (Special Commission, 2010: rec. 1). Independent adoptions, it was said, are ‘not compatible with the Convention’ (Special Commission, 2010: rec. 23).
It will be shown that independent ICAs are compatible with the 1993 Convention. The checks that are imposed by both the receiving state and the state of origin mean that they fully comply with its terms. The claim that independent ICA is inconsistent with the Convention can only be sustained by ignoring things that are in the Convention and inserting things that are not. However, what is legal under the articles of the Convention is not necessarily ethical and if the ethical case against independent ICA is relatively strong, then one might concede that such adoptions violate the spirit of the Convention, even if they abide by the letter. However, the empirical basis for the argument that independent adoption is more open to abuse than organised forms of adoption is weak. Because the claim is a comparative one, the evidence must also be comparative, but such evidence is very limited. An indirect comparative analysis of independent adoptions against state organized adoptions was made in a report by Defence for Children International, ISS, and Terre des Hommes that circulated at the discussions preceding the Convention (Defence for Children International, 1991; Parra-Aranguren, 1994: 13). The report considered comments solicited from member organizations in 12 receiving states and 11 sending states with somewhat inconclusive results: ‘According to the receiving country reports, illicit and questionable practices are most often linked to independent adoptions; in contrast, there is no agreement (consensus) among country of origin reports, some of which associate them with agencies, independent adoptions or both’ (Defence for Children International, 1991: 14). Terre des Hommes and ISS have gone on to harden their position against independent ICA without either of them appearing to have undertaken systematic comparison of independent and agency adoptions. Sometimes, it is simply assumed that independent ICA is more risky (ISS, 2004). Sometimes the heightened risk is presented as a logical deduction that does not require empirical support, as in the Terre des Hommes report Adoption at What Cost (Lammerant and Hofstetter, 2008). The argument against independent adoption by UNICEF also lacks a comparative evidence base. In calling for all adoptions to be centralised, UNICEF makes the universal claim that ‘by far the worst and most frequent problems arise in the context of ‘private’ adoptions’ and selects sources to fit this claim, beginning with a newspaper report from Russia (UNICEF, 1998). UNICEF is in a delicate position as criticism of a state for, say, widespread corruption, is a much more serious matter than making a general assumption about corruption in civil society. It may, eg jeopardize reform initiatives undertaken in conjunction with that state. It is perfectly understandable, therefore, that criticism of states by UNICEF is muted. However, the resulting one-sided presentation of problems as emanating from society should not be mistaken for objective analysis, as such an analysis would at least consider the contrary possibility that in a venal state the sphere of civil society may give scope for people to act with relative honesty and dignity.